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3ORGANIZING FOR EQUITABLE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The Significance of Community Empowerment
Organizations for Unions
Ron Applegate
In response to the pervasive pursuit oflow-road economic development strate-
gies, several local unions have taken the lead in devising high-road strategies for
their local economies. Unions are known for their involvement in economic de-
velopment at firm, industry, and national levels, but initiatives to recast the eco-
nomic development process at the community level constitutes a departure.
Through its endorsement by the Working for America Institute, the departure has
gained the support, if not financial backing, of the AFL-CIO. Given the newness
of these initiatives, their potential impact remains to be determined. However, ex-
amining the organizations already operating on this urban terrain, community-
based development organizations (CBDOs), affords a useful perspective for
assessing the implications of the newest union tactic for advancing economic de-
velopment goals.
Based on their historic roles in the New Deal system for governing U.S. eco-
nomic development, unions and CBDOs are logical allies. Although their re-
spective dates of incorporation into the system differ-unions, beginning in
1935; CBDOs, beginning in 1964-the government's rationale for their inclusion
was the same: to include within the economic development governance structure
institutions that were dedicated to ensuring the system's equitable operation.
Unions were responsible for gaining justice for wage workers; CBDOs, for achiev-
ing justice for residents of low-income neighborhoods. The terms of incorpora-
tion did not preclude the institutional agents most responsible for reproducing
inequality from undercutting union and CBDO efforts to advance equality. Busi-
nesses and governments, even when paying lip service to the importance of
unions and CBDOs for expanding equality, repeatedly hampered their "junior
partners" from carrying out their designated roles.
Despite their commonalities, unions and CBDOs are known for their differ-
ences. This circumstance is also tied to their participation in the New Deal eco-
nomic development system. Within the system's governance structure, unions
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and CBDOs were positioned apart from each other, defined by the ways in which
the interests of their respective constituencies diverged rather than by their con-
stituents' common interest in expanding equality. This disconnection was rein-
forced by the New Deal system's mode of operation. The government charged
different collective agents with controlling different dimensions of development
to achieve economic stability, security, and equality. However, in the absence of
governmental coordination to realize these public purposes, the system's more
powerful agents disregarded the public's interest where it conflicted with the pur-
suit of their private interests. In a system whose commitment to eradicating in-
equality proved to be more nominal than real, unions and CBDOs were left to
frame separate strategies for advancing equality.
Impediments to the work of advancing equality have only increased with the
system's "neoliberal" restructuring, whereby government has outsourced ulti-
mate responsibility for governing economic development to markets. Because
market outcomes are shaped by the power differentials among market partici-
pants, the government's restoration of market governance has restored the power
imbalances that the New Deal governance system was intended to overcome. In
addition to sacrificing the governance role of unions and communities to that of
businesses, the government's retreat from "mixed" governance since the 1980s has
also entailed abandoning economic equality as a public policy priority. By un-
dermining the high-road foundations that supported the creation of a broad
middle class, neoliberal policies have fostered a dramatic reversaL Low-wage jobs
and increasing inequality are once again defining characteristics of the U.S. eco-
nomic system.
Union efforts to deal with the current system have primarily focused on coun-
teracting its inegalitarian effects. But these efforts have also led a growing num-
ber of unions to address the system configuration responsible for these effects.
Unions have challenged public and private versions of neoliberal economic de-
velopment, while actively seeking a new basis and new partners for restoring a
high-road approach. To the extent that unions are engaged in restructuring their
organization and operation to assert control over economic development, they
are replicating the approach taken by leading CBDOs over the last two decades.
As a result, the historic differences between unions and CBDOs 'Ire increasingly
overshadowed by their convergence on parallel empowerment strategies for ad-
vancing equality.
Union-CBDO relations are also being altered by a second dimension of the
union response to neoliberal economic development. Seeking to regain power
lost in the turn from New Deal to neoliberal governance, local unions are turn-
ing to their communities. More precisely, unions are returning to the communi-
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ties whose interaction with the "new unionism" of the 1930s created the political
power base responsible for New Deal labor reform and union inclusion in the
economic development system. Unions are repositioning themselves on the
urban terrain that enabled unions to frame workers' demands for justice as a so-
cial demand and to embed workers' organizations within a social movement.
Even as they echo the past, union efforts to reground their reempowerment in
their "home" turf alter the present. In many cities, the union turn to communi-
ties means that unions are operating in the same communities as CBDOs. In
addition to their convergence on parallel empowerment strategies, unions and
CBDOs are operationally aligned in ways that foster their collaboration in im-
plementing these strategies.
The prospects for union-CBDO collaboration are increased by the mutual
benefits that full collaboration would make possible. Collaboration to control
economic development for equitable outcomes would establish a new organiza-
tional foundation for unions and CBDOs to carry out their historic roles of ex-
panding equality, enabling both institutions to expand the capacity and reach of
their individual programs. Collaboration would necessarily reconfigure the gov-
ernance framework responsible for undermining union and CBDO efforts. In-
stead of debating how to begin reconfiguring the existing governance structure,
attention could shift to expanding collaboration to other community partners for
maximum reconfiguration.
These possibilities are only significant to the extent that the present moment
constitutes a turning point in union-CBDO relations. It is equally true, however,
that much of the potential contained in the present juncture is derived from con-
structive interaction between unions and community organizations at similar
junctures in the past. In other words, the union-CBDO relationship is the most
recent iteration of a longer relationship between unions and community organi-
zations, and the long-term relationship features collaboration. Moreover, the
content of previous collaboration has been the common pursuit of empower-
ment: working in concert to create organizations capable of altering the existing
economic development power structure and exercising control over the eco-
nomic development process. The present moment is auspicious because the
obstacles to collaboration in the recent past are no longer operative, and both
partners are focused on empowerment agendas that are community based.
To assess the potential of the growing convergence between unions and
CBDOs on empowerment agendas for economic development, in this chapter I
survey current union-CBDO relations from the perspective of their neglected
history. This perspective suggests why the relationship has been dormant and
highlights how changes in the community side of the relationship enable the
56 RON APPLEGATE
relationship to be established on a new footing. Due to their extensive practical
experience in community-controlled development, CBDOs bring to the relation-
ship an unprecedented capacity to promote equitable economic development.
ORGANIZING TO CONTROL COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT: THE CBDO EXPERIENCE
As the term implies, CBDOs are a specialized category of community organiza-
tion, focused on increasing community residents' share of the benefits derived
from economic development by involving residents in the development process.
The term is relatively recent, originating with the community development cor-
porations (CDCs) established since the 1970s to conduct economic development
projects in, and for the benefit of, impoverished communities. To acknowledge
the fact that CDCs are not the only community organizations functioning as bot-
tom-up development organizations and to encompass the variety of organiza-
tions in this category, I follow the convention of using the broader term, CBDO.
Origins: The Empowerment Model
of Community Organizing
Viewed from the perspective of the history of community organizing in the
United States, it is evident that some community organizations inhabited the
CBDO category before it was enunciated. Particularly relevant to the prehistory
of CBDOs is the "empowerment" model of community organizing. The inven-
tion of the empowerment model effectively reinvented community organizing in
the United States, by adding a political activist approach to the social work and
neighborhood improvement traditions. As first enunciated by organizer Saul
Alinsky, the model responded to the unequal incomes and living standards in
many U.S. communities, by locating the roots of their residents' inequality in the
unequal control they possessed over their lives and building community organi-
zations with the power to overcome their inequality and powerlessness. Succes-
sive iterations of the community empowerment model have informed the
community organizing that accompanied the labor organizing of the 1930s, the
social movement organizing of the 1960s, and the urban organizing of the 1970s
and 1980s variously described as "citizen action" or "new populism" (Fisher 1994,
46-59,91-109,121-52; Frost 2001, 71-117).
The community empowerment model's construction and evolution is central
to this chapter for more specific reasons. First, the model has union roots. Because
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unions were central to the model's birth in the 1930s, the empowerment model
of community organizing was significantly influenced by union conceptions of
empowerment. Second, the empowerment model's continuing reliance on the
human resources provided by community residents-in Alinsky's words, on
"people power" -led to a conception and practice of community empowerment
that includes elements not present in the union version. Community organizing
to empower residents to gain the benefits of economic development initially im-
itated, even as it elaborated on, labor organizing: mobilizing residents to bargain
with and compel concessions from those controlling the development system.
However, in the face of unyielding opposition to these efforts, some community
organizations expanded their empowerment agenda to include residents gaining
direct control over the development process within their communities.
The bargaining-to-control transition was not a simple progression, nor was it
continuous. One of the community organizations in Alinsky's organizational net-
work first established community-controlled development in the 1960s, but the
achievement proved to be temporary. Community organizations were able to
reestablish community-controlled development in the 1970s and 1980s, by merg-
ing the empowerment model of community organizing with the CDC model of
community development to form an "empowerment CBDO" (my term). Recur-
rent union efforts to make the move from exercising indirect control over eco-
nomic development to gaining direct control are well known. But so are the
unsatisfactory results. The union record imparts additional significance to iden-
tifying the dimensions of the community empowerment model that have enabled
CBDOs to make the move.
Alinsky's Contribution: Community Organizing
as Labor Organizing
The empowerment model's beginnings date to Alinsky's work in the 1930s to
build a new type of community organization. As a University of Chicago gradu-
ate student, he participated in sociology department programs to create com-
munity organizations to combat the "community disorganization" afflicting poor
ethnic neighborhoods. The program was based on the assumption that disorga-
nization was rooted in cultural differences that these neighborhoods sustained,
creating conditions of "cultural deprivation." Accordingly, the purpose of com-
munity organizing was to foster the social integration of community residents by
facilitating their cultural assimilation (O'Connor 2001, 26-53). Alinsky became
critical of the program's emphasis on cultural sources of disorganization to the
exclusion of political sources-in particular, the power that businesses and gov-
ernments exercised over neighborhood residents' lives. ,!,hrough his contact with
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CIO unions, which were organizing in the same working-class neighborhoods,
Alinsky discovered an organizing approach that addressed his concerns. He was
particularly drawn to CIO organizing techniques that empowered workers to
function as a union on the shop floor before the union was formally established
or recognized by the employer. Exposure to the CIO model of labor organizing
inspired Alinsky to recast the Chicago sociology model of community organiz-
ing, by locating the issue of power-specifically, the need for the powerless to
confront the powerful in order to gain control over their lives-at its core (Alin-
sky 1972).
The union influence on Alinsky's initial experiment with organizing for em-
powerment was as direct as it was profound, prominently featuring collaboration
with the Packing Workers Organizing Committee (PWOC). To create the soli-
darity required to force Chicago's Big Four meatpackers to bargain with their
workers, PWOC's Herb March sought to connect PWOC's organizing efforts with
community organizations that did not reinforce workers' ethnic divisions. Since
such organizations were both scarce and confined to providing youth programs,
Alinsky responded by forming a new organization. Founded in 1939, the Back of
the Yards Neighborhood Council (BYNC) sought to unify Polish, Slovak, Lithu-
anian, Bohemian, and Irish residents behind the goal of improving their collec-
tive welfare. Since the income of most households came from working in the
meatpacking plants, translating this general purpose into the immediate goal of
pursuing wage increases was not difficult. Identifying the basis for unifying all
ethnic groups behind this goal was. The obvious cultural connection, the Catholi-
cism that the ethnically defined groups held in common, was routinely linked to
ethnicity in ways that reinforced division. As a result, BYNC organizers appealed
to workers' common religious bond, but in carefully chosen terms. Working with
younger priests, they focused the community's religious attention on Rerum No-
varum, the papal encyclical that endorsed the right of workers to organize in or-
der to improve their working conditions and living standards (Horwitt 1989,55-
71; Slayton 1986, 189-211).
By successfully articulating a shared purpose and rationale, the BYNCwas able
to bring about unprecedented collaboration between the neighborhood's two
most important institutions, the Catholic Church and the meatpacking union.
With representatives of the churches and the PWOC constituting the new orga-
nization's core, the BYNC garnered widespread support from residents. By engi-
neering the joint appearance of Bishop Bernard Sheil of the Chicago diocese and
the CIO's John 1. Lewis at a massive public rally for the PWOC, the BYNC dra-
matically demonstrated its distinctive contribution to working-class solidarity.
Byextending their reach to include city hall support, the BYNC served as the pres-
sure group that brought meatpacking companies to the bargaining table. When
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the companies conceded to demands that were as much the community's as the
union's, there was no doubt about the BYNC's capacity to confront Chicago's
power structure by building a community form of institutional power (Alinsky
1972; Fisher 1984,51-54; Horwitt 1989,71-81).
In 1940 Alinsky established the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) for the
purpose of building "people's organizations" like the BYNC in working-class
neighborhoods of other industrial cities. He envisioned the IAF as a national
movement of community organizations working in collaboration with the labor
movement to gain justice for working-class Americans. IAF organizations be-
came known for their success in adapting labor organizing tactics-strikes, pick-
ets' boycotts, sit-ins-to community situations and in devising new techniques
for exerting pressure, from mass disruption of business operations to public em-
barrassment of officials to proxy voting at annual stockholder meetings. The aim
of these tactical innovations, as in the CIO organizing model that inspired them,
was empowerment through confrontation. In Alinsky's community version of
compelling justice from the power structure, confrontations were staged between
the communities experiencing inequality and the institutions capable of redress-
ing their unequal status. In practice, such confrontation entailed mobilizing a
community's institutional resources within a single community organization.
The resulting "organization of organizations" assumed the responsibility for
defining and implementing an action program focused on targeting "enemies" of
justice and pressuring them into a negotiating posture (Alinsky 1971;Fisher 1984,
47-51).
Alinsky's structuring of a community organization as an "organization of or-
ganizations" was central to his vision of constructing a "people's organization" ca-
pable of generating "people power:' A structure for realizing community control
could have been established by making membership individual rather than orga-
nizational. But an individual-membership organization contradicted Alinsky's
CIO-shaped assessment of the organizational form required to empower disen-
franchised communities. Because communities were controlled externally by in-
stitutions that exercised their power by working in collaboration, challenging this
power structure required communities to create a parallel institutional power.
Deeming a coalition of community institutions to be necessary from the incep-
tion, Alinsky built collaboration into the new community organization. His or-
ganizational structure imitated the structure of national CIO unions, rather than
that of union locals, since he sought to create within communities the power that
CIO unions exercised within industries. The resulting organization was meant to
provide for communities what the CIO was providing for workers: the same
means of empowerment possessed by business and political elites (Betten and
Austin 1990, 152-61).
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TWO's Contribution: From Indirect to Direct Control
In 1959, at the urging of black community leaders, Alinsky formed the first IAF
organization in a black slum neighborhood, The Woodlawn Organization (TWO)
in Chicago. Alinsky was initially hesitant about crossing America's color line,
concerned that the racial divide might prove an insurmountable obstacle for the
organization to overcome. But TWO proved to be another IAF success story,
winning the customary IAF victories: empowering Woodlawn's residents to se-
cure jobs from businesses along with job training programs, affordable housing,
and improved services from the city. In the end, TWO not only inspired the cre-
ation of additional IAF organizations in other black neighborhoods but added
new elements to the IAF model. The additions resulted from TWO's ability to
turn an "urban renewal" program into an opportunity for a community-defined
. version of comprehensive community redevelopment. TWO members success-
fully insinuated their organization into the development process by establishing
TWO's capacity to function as part of the system controlling development. TWO
thereby became the first community organization to assert control over the plan-
ning and implementation of its systematic revitalization (Alinsky 1972;Horwitt
1989,363-449).
TWO's organizational development altered the lAP's economic development
horizon. By the 1950s, IAF organizations were well known for their incremental
approach to economic development, starting with the lowest common denomi-
nator issues and progressively setting and achieving more expansive goals. TWO's
achievements recast the endpoint of the organizing process: not simply aiming to
compel justice from those outside the community controlling the allocation of
development resources but also seeking to acquire direct community control of
resource allocation to ensure justice. TWO's alteration of the IAF model was it-
self incremental, making successive additions that extended the model to its log-
ical conclusion. But the impact of arriving at the conclusion was transformative.
Before TWO, the community control exercised by IAF organizations over eco-
nomic development was indirect, pressuring institutions possessing control to do
the right thing. To the IAF repertoire, TWO added direct instruments of control.
After TWO, community empowerment encompassed possessing the power to
plan and implement development inside the community, along with the having
the power to compel concessions from those possessing the power to plan and
implement development outside the community.
From the perspective of what came before, TWO represented the culmination
of Alinsky's attempt to make altering power relations into the crux of commu-
nity organizing. From the perspective of what was to follow, TWO provided a
CBDO version of the empowerment model before CBDOs officially came into
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existence. However, in the 1960s TWO's impact was defined by immediate con-
siderations, not long-term perspectives. In the face of opposition from city gov-
ernment, TWO's success proved to be temporary. In the face of co-optation from
the federal government, the empowerment model of community organizing was




In the 1960s the appeal of community empowerment as a solution to problems
facing impoverished, disenfranchised communities was not confined to new so-
cial movements but extended to the federal government's response to these move-
ments. When the civil rights movement succeeded in pressuring government to
resume the New Deal assault on inequality, government officials identified com-
munity organization as a primary means for conducting their War on Poverty.
Through the Community Action Program (CAP), and an army of local commu-
nity action agencies (CAAs) to implement the program, the new Office of Equal
Opportunity (OEO) effectively incorporated community organizations into the
nation's economic development system. CAAs were established as the system's
community-level agents, charged with extending the system's benefits to citizens
who remained outside its reach, by transforming the neighborhoods in which
these citizens were concentrated. As a central feature of the Johnson administra-
tion's Great Society agenda, community organizations reached an unprecedented
status, officially tied to the nation's economic growth machine.
In the summer of 1964, when the government adopted an empowerment
model of community organization, Alinsky and the IAFwere the object of media
attention. Fortune editor Charles Silberman first thrust them into the limelight
when his Crisis in Black and White championed TWO as the solution to the racial
problems festering in cities outside the South. Favorable publicity led civic groups
in Kansas City and Buffalo to invite the IAF to their cities, as did citizens in
Rochester after a summer riot, and the preparations garnered more publicity.
When the OEO turned to an empowerment model; however, it was not the IAF
model. The OEO looked instead to empowerment programs operated by the
President's Council on Juvenile Delinquency under Robert Kennedy's supervi-
sion. The aim of these programs was to improve community conditions to the
point that younger community residents could acquire the skills needed to at-
tain economic opportunity. This life-altering experience, whose conclusion was
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marked when young people relocated from their blighted communities, was de-
fined as individual empowerment. These programs represented the further evo-
lution of the social work programs that Alinsky had rejected in the 1930s; some
of which were carried out by his peers and successors. To distinguish his model
of empowerment from theirs, and to rebuff any appearance of accepting a back-
handed compliment, Alinsky referred to the version of empowerment incorpo-
rated into the CAP as "political pornography" (Halpern 1995,89-105; Horwitt
1989,445-82).
While Alinsky distanced himself from a program guilty of sacrificing com-
munity empowerment to individual empowerment, others did not see the situa-
tion so starkly. CAP was an amalgamation of several programs, and activists
targeted various elements with the potential to foster community empowerment.
The most well-known instance was the authorization given to CAAs to assert
community control over antipoverty programs by facilitating the "maximum fea-
sible participation" of community residents. Above all, because the "community
action" framework provided a new means for pursuing community-provided so-
lutions, and because the CAP's creation apart from other government agencies
was designed to facilitate experimentation, many activists chose to see CAP as a
program whose content was yet to be determined. The result was an intense con-
test to determine the outcome (Halpern 1995, 106-18).
The UAW Role: Facilitating Unintended Consequences
Among those looking to shape the government's new involvement in community
organization, and better situated than most to have an impact, was Walter
Reuther of the United Automobile Workers. Under Reuther's direction the UAW
was already involved in providing support for a new wave of community orga-
nizing efforts undertaken by a new generation. Along with the PWOC's succes-
sor union, the United Packinghouse Workers of America, UAW leaders had close
personal and financial connections with the direct-democracy, community orga-
nizing projects of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). UAW leaders supported these commu-
nity projects as part of their ongoing political project to build a broad-based po-
litical coalition for renewing reform. Their specific aim was to continue the New
Deal's restructuring of US. political economy to achieve democratic controls over
industry and economic development. Consequently, when Lyndon Johnson de-
cided to make reform the hallmark of his presidency and turned to Reuther for
support, UAWleaders heralded the moment as a long-awaited opportunity to ful-
fill the New Deal's unfulfilled promise (Boyle 1995, 158-84; Frost 2001; Lichten-
stein 1995,381-89).
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Seeking to define the new situation in accordance with long-standing UAW
aims, Reuther and his staff threw themselves into their distinctive mediating role:
convincing Johnson to use the War on Poverty as the means to reembrace the ne-
glected goals of maximum employment and purchasing power, while forming the
Citizens Crusade against Poverty to unify their reform coalition behind an agenda
calling for democratic economic planning, full production, and equitable income
distribution. They made it their special mission to provide the coherency missing
in the piecemeal, compartmentalized antipoverty programs. The chosen vehicle
was their plan for an "urban TVA." The UAW's Demonstration Cities (DC)
proposal realigned the CAP with a planning and reconstruction program to re-
habilitate the central cores of American cities. Whereas CAP focused on a neigh-
borhood crisis, DC addressed a broader urban crisis. CAP focused on service
provision in neighborhoods that were predominantly black and low income, while
DC connected neighborhoods with downtowns and addressed housing and pub-
lic services for blacks and whites, both low and middle income. DC would pull to-
gether the divisions that the CAP patchwork continued, while demonstrating the
practicality and rationality of democratic planning for urban redevelopment.
As they did during the industrial mobilization of World War II and during the
postwar construction of industrial peace, Reuther and his staff were again setting
forth a proposal whose ultimate aim was to create broad social-democratic con-
trols over economic development. what they got, as they did before, was some-
thing less. Reuther and other UAWofficials were central players in the presidential
task force to define a national urban policy, and their results were remarkable: the
creation of a new Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) with
their own proposal, renamed Model Cities, as its inaugural program. But they did
not succeed in their ambitious efforts to relocate CAP to HUD and have Reuther
named the first head of HUD, so they could effectively direct the War on Poverty.
Due to the compromises exacted as the price of putting any urban policy in place,
Model Cities ended up looking more like CAP than not: ultimately offering no
challenge to existing governance relations, while replicating the residential, race,
and class divisions that DC was framed to overcome (Boyle 1995, 184-92,200-
205; Halpern 1995, 118-26).
As UAW leaders discovered in their efforts to seize Great Society opportuni-
ties such as CAP, they were caught up in a singularly brief moment. Despite ad-
vancing plans that outlined a sequence of change, in order to carry out the many
facets of needed reform, they found that second rounds were rare-unless they
involved a retreat. The social movements to which these reforms were a response
had aroused degrees and varieties of activism to which government was not pre-
pared to respond. Moreover, the administration was preoccupied, more focused
on figuring out how to respond to the war in Vietnam than to the War on Poverty.
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By increasing demands on government attention and funds, while eliciting in-
creased opposition to the administration among reform proponents, war policy
undermined any chance that the parties interested in reform could negotiate their
differences over the pace and direction of reform. Given the magnitude of his
hopes, reinforced by his new access to the power structure, Reuther chose to de-
fend Johnson's reform record. In the end, reforms were decisively marked by the
government's rapid shift away from responsive engagement to disengagement.
Because the restructuring process that Reuther envisioned was not completed,
his social-democratic aims were more perverted than realized. From the more
critical perspective of community activists, Reuther's chosen approach to serving
as a Great Society architect was part of the problem. They saw his emphasis on
government-sponsored community organization as following from his focus on
gaining national-level acceptance for community empowerment to the exclusion
of building the local-level power required. His preference for top-down solutions
was not incidental to the top-down approach that ultimately prevailed. When
Reuther was unable to deliver the ongoing reconstruction process he envisioned,
community organizers were left to contend with the restructuring that had oc-
curred: a government role in directing community organizations that was un-
precedented, and community organizations that manifested an unprecedented
dependence on government for their existence and agenda.
The union-community organization relationship unraveled in the face of the
gap between the situation that communities faced by 1968 and the situation that
Reuther perceived in 1964.Within the ensuing splits, unions and community or-
ganizations tended to end up on opposite sides of liberalism's divide, as the new
generation of community organizers were drawn to and influenced by the pe-
riod's social movements. The uncivil war that pitted new social movements
against the labor movement-civil rights and women's groups pursuing legal ac-
tions against unions, with unions defending discriminatory practices; unions op-
posing the antiwar movement, with New Left attacks on unions as being part of
the racist, imperialist Establishment-only deepened differences between labor
organizing and community organizing. The disruption of union-CBDO relations
in the 1960s generated lasting wariness, if not outright distrust, on both sides.
Government-Posed Dilemmas for Community
Empowerment Organizing
Beyond making clear to community organizations that having powerful Wash-
ington allies on your side wasn't enough, CAP's restructuring clarified funda-
mental features of their unprecedented circumstances. Three years after CAP
officials authorized "maximum feasible participation," Congress required each
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CAA to obtain local government authorization to operate and each CAA board
to draw their members in equal numbers from elected officials, private-sector
representatives, and community residents (O'Connor 2001, 167-73). Top-down,
local-level control over operations was joined with top-down, federal-level con-
trol over programming. Together, these formed the ultimate terms under which
community organizations were incorporated into the economic development
system.
The community dimension of the power that remained in CAAs was defined
as the power of community self-help: residents' capacity to improve their living
conditions and foster their human development by working together to maxi-
mize their collective use of federal funding and technical assistance. Mobilizing
aggregate demand for services among residents while simultaneously providing
the demanded services-that is, functioning as a community service agency-
became the condition for CAAs to receive continued funding. The government
formally acknowledged the reality in 1974. Consistent with previous actions that
declared the urban crisis to be over and shelved the Model Cities program, the
Nixon administration replaced the OEO with the Community Services Admin-
istration (Halpern 1995, 124-26).
The services that CAAs (the CAA name continued to be used under the Com-
munity Services Administration) provided were far from negligible and met sub-
stantive needs. But the limits of their provision and the sources of their derivation
were inscribed within the CAA framework, not subject to ongoing revision by
community residents. To independent community organizations whose purpose
was to continue to challenge these limits and sources, CAAs posed a substantive
challenge. CAAs provided a nonthreatening alternative for businesses and gov-
ernments seeking to avoid the demands of traditional community empowerment
organizations. With a CAA in town, targets of community pressure campaigns
no longer felt the same compulsion to provide community-demanded services,
much less concede control over development to the affected communities.
The government's presence in the arena of community organization generated
recurrent problems for independent community empowerment organizations.
Many of these problems were experienced as technical problems of coexistence:
surviving against a more numerous and well-funded adversary. However, the un-
derlying political nature of these resource problems was brought out more starkly
with the government's increasing use of community organizations as economic
development organizations, and not simply as service agencies. Beginning in the
1970s, the government funded community development corporations (CDCs) to
increase the number of community-level physical development projects-hous-
ing, commercial, and infrastructure-in communities unable to attract private-
sector developers. As empowerment organizations recognized, the program
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offered access to the technical power required to realize full community empow-
erment. As designed, however, the program did not disseminate expertise among
community residents, relegating them to a secondary, advisory role in the CDC
development process. Since program participation was offered on government
terms that undermined full empowerment, the program confronted indepen-
dents with an impossible choice: foregoing access to needed development ex-
pertise to preserve their empowerment approach, or sacrificing empowerment
organizing to acquire the expertise.
Resurgence: Community Restoration
of the Community Empowerment Model
Community-Government Conflict over
Community Empowerment
Since their introduction, CDCs have expanded dramatically in number, as gov-
ernments have identified these community organizations as the receptacle for
the remnants of antipoverty and urban programs. Although these program as-
signments have been accompanied by limited funding, they have carried large
amounts-of rhetoric extolling their importance for economic opportunity and in-
dividual empowerment. Consequently, CDCs have proved to be the mechanism
for bringing the differences between the rival programs of community-based em-
powerment to the fore. For example, Jack Kemp's contribution to Reaganomics
was to empower the poor by turning CDCs into marketing agents of government
resources: turning the poor into homeowners by selling them their HUD hous-
ing units; promoting jobs for the poor by reclassifying their communities as "en-
terprise zones" (EZs) and giving tax breaks to businesses willing to operate within
their boundaries. The Clinton administration, by adding traditional community
programs into the mix along with more subsidies, sought to enhance the align-
ment between markets and poor communities. To drive home the potential of
making communities more marketable sites for investors, while better preparing
residents to participate in markets, EZs were renamed "empowerment zones."
Because successive government-defined empowerment programs have largely
failed to stimulate community economic development, they have drained politi-
cal meaning from the public's perception of "empowerment." But independent
CBDOs seeking to empower their communities to control their development
have had a very different experience. Against their own definition of empower-
ment, these CBDOs have had to contend with government programs whose ra-
tionale has ignored and devalued what these community organizations seek to
achieve. Community-defined empowerment programs have sought, at a mini-
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mum, to counteract the harm caused by market-controlled development. Maxi-
mally, they have sought to compel alterations in the operation of market controls
or to replace them with community controls. For communities, market-con-
trolled development has been the problem to be overcome through organization.
Conversely, from the government side, market-controlled development has either
been allowed to provide the decisive solutions or has been championed as pro-
viding the best possible solutions. Consequently, government-defined empower-
ment programs have narrowly focused on preparing community residents, and
other community resources, for market inclusion. As the latest iteration of gov-
ernment -defined community development highlights, the enduring relationship
is one in which the government's logic of community development effectively
stands the logic held by CBDOs on its head.
The Emergence of Empowerment CBDOs
Some CBDOs have yielded to the pressures of working in a government-domi-
nated arena, eliminating organizing for empowerment as the price of continuing
to function as a development organization. Others have taken the opposite ap-
proach, continuing to base their organizations on community mobilization for
empowerment. These CBDOs have upheld the primary significance of organiz-
ing, even though mounting pressure campaigns to secure their ultimate develop-
ment objectives of community control had to be placed on hold. A third type of
CBDO has managed-in a trial-and-error fashion, to be sure-to adhere to Alin-
sky's model of combining organizing and development. Crucial to their success
has been their use of Alinsky's tactics of constructive confrontation to shape their
relationship with government community development programs.
CBDOs in this category-the organizations I am referring to as empower-
ment CBDOs-have acted to compete with government programs: meeting the
community needs addressed by government-sponsored CBDOs, while creating
programs whose levels of comprehensiveness and innovation surpass govern-
ment efforts. They have effectively turned the government's invasion of their ter-
rain into an ongoing contest: mobilizing against government program limitations
and for program reforms, even as they successfully fight to use existing programs
for their own purposes. They have sought to use the government's weak program
of empowerment wherever possible to enhance their own strong program, build-
ing community activism and control into development programs where the gov-
ernment has sought to exclude such activism and control. At the foundation of
their stance is their rejection of the dichotomy that government has sought to im-
pose on the arena of community organization: the dictum that those organiza-
tions working to change the existing system cannot also work within the system
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but must choose one path or the other. Through their combination of empower-
ment organizing and development activity these CBDOs have persisted in oper-
ating in both domains. The measure of their achievement, in accordance with the
community version of community development logic, is that these organizations
constitute the logical extension of TWO. In the face of the government's installa-
tion of a rival conception and practice of empowerment within government-
sponsored community organizations, these groups have responded by providing
an enhanced version of the model that the government shunted aside in 1964
(Bruyn and Meehan 1987).
A Reconstructed Foundation for Empowerment Organizing
Experienced in working to change the development system as they operate within
it, empowerment CBDOs-the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative in Bos-
ton, the Coalition for a Better Acre in Lowell, East Brooklyn Congregations in
New York, and others-have successfully instituted a comprehensive organiza-
tional approach. Their emphasis on combining activities that suffer from separa-
tion has brought together agitation and implementation, community-provided
services and community-controlled economic revitalization, the human devel-
opment of residents and the physical development of communities. The key to
advancing their broad agenda has been their attention to, and success in, creating
new institutional capacity within their communities: using the community's ex-
isting institutions as the foundation for building new institutions focused on de-
velopment. By relying on the community's human and institutional resources,
these CBDOs have built the new institutions required to control each phase of the
development process: mobilizing for participation, resident training in the de-
velopment process, multilevel planning from neighborhood to project, program
administration and project implementation, and ownership and management of
the social and physical assets developed. These CBDOS have strengthened com-
munity institutions externally as well, building coalitions across cities to collab-
orate on programs across neighborhoods, to expand political education efforts,
and to form broad pressure groups when pressure is required (Gittell1992; Med-
off and Sklar 1994).
To advance their empowerment agenda, these CBDOs have begun forming re-
gional networks of their peers. The Massachusetts Association of Community
Development Corporations has explicitly focused their collective efforts on en-
abling member organizations to be structured and operate as CBDOs with the
capacity to combine organizing and development. Empowerment CBDOs have
also collaborated extensively with supportive foundations. As empowerment
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CBDOs have benefited from the practical experience gained since the 1970s, so
have the foundations that have supplied the funds for community economic de-
velopment experiments. Foundations have become vital partners in establishing,
and advancing, comprehensive community organizations. In sum, empower-
ment CBDOs have been engaged in constructing a viable organizational infra-
structure in the community arena of national economic development, one with
the capacity to contribute significantly to the national system's reconstruction
(Sirianni and Friedland 2001, 56-66).
Because the disruption generated by the government's adoption of commu-
nity empowerment extended to the relationship between community organizing
and labor organizing, unions have been more bystanders than participants in the
contest over who defines the content of community empowerment organiza-
tions. But this situation, too, is changing. The existence of empowerment CBDOs
is particularly relevant for unions engaged in restructuring their organizations to
become active in economic development, while confronting the need to restruc-
ture the economic development system in order to succeed. They provide a model
for moving forward, manifesting that restructuring along alternative lines can be
successfully pursued, despite concerted efforts to co-opt and derail the alterna-
tive. Empowerment CBDOs also afford an experienced partner in the double re-
structuring process. The potential of that partnership has yet to be realized, but
its outlines can be glimpsed in the relationships forged in living wage campaigns
between participating unions and the Association of Community Organizations
for Reform Now (ACORN). Most important, a solid foundation for realizing the
partnership is being constructed as unions replicate the recent experience of em-
powerment CBDOs, bringing together empowerment organizing and economic
development activity within the boundaries of a single organization.
EMPOWERMENT CSDOS AND UNIONS
The vantage point of the present-with the community restoration of the com-
munity empowerment model and the revitalization of the controls involved in
community-controlled development-highlights the importance of possessing
the organizational capacity to promote equitable development on two fronts. On
the first front, CBDOs successfully organized to acquire the power required to
gain concessions from those possessing ultimate power: the power to allocate re-
sources, to decide where human, material, and financial resources are invested,
and, thereby, who benefits and who doesn't. On the second front, CBDOs suc-
cessfully organized to place ultimate power in community hands. To possess the
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capacity to exercise both direct and indirect control over development is to pos-
sess the power to create as well as compel equitable development outcomes.
The difficulties that CBDOs have faced in acquiring and exercising this dou-
ble capacity have implications for unions that run in two directions. First, because
the consistency in changing government policy toward community empower-
ment organizing has been its adherence to an opposed mode of promoting eco-
nomic development, empowerment organizing involves creative engagement
with government. Although the details obviously differ, the incorporation of
unions into the governance structure of the national economic development sys-
tem has been as disruptive for unions as for CBDOs. The terms of incorporation
enabled unions to exercise more control over development than CAA5, but
unions have their own version of dimi~ished controls that require recapture. Of
particular significance, the actions of Congress and the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) have placed on indefinite hold union efforts to use collective bar-
gaining to address businesses' exclusive possession of ultimate power over busi-
ness operations. Conversely, because unions possessed enough control to affect
the exercise of business power they have emphasized defending that control when
the government has reneged on its commitments or has transferred the govern-
ment's share of control to markets that were, in turn, largely controlled by
corporations.
The second implication is highlighted by the first: to engage creatively with
government, along with private-sector opponents of community-controlled de-
velopment, CBDOs must build the community power base required to prevail in
these confrontations. The necessary focus on national-level neoliberal gover-
nance regimes cannot come at the expense of attention to community-level coali-
tion building. Walter Reuther's example spells out the consequences of such
neglect. To the extent that unions have turned back to community power build-
ing, they not only exhibit their grasp of this point but also their actions signal a
pivotal moment in the union response to the spread oflow-road strategies-the
turn from defense to offense.
It is in the arena of the union shift from defense to offense-in union actions
to restore lost controls and create new controls-that community experiences
with empowerment resonate with union experiences. The clearest connection has
been generated by labor organizing to retain and expand the power to compel
concessions from employers in collective bargaining. Not only have unions
framed "corporate campaigns" that utilize tactics long used by community orga-
nizations but unions have solicited and received the participation of community
organizations in the successful conduct of these campaigns. On the basis of hav-
ing jointly resisted management cost cutting in the workplace, unions and com-
munity organizations have joined forces outside the workplace, collaborating to
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counteract the community effects of the inequality generated by a one-dimen-
sional exercise of corporate power.
A less visible connection is the one derived from union organizing to gain di-
rect power over economic development. These efforts are less visible because they
are taking place outside the workplace power contest. But their construction and
evolution on the community terrain makes them highly visible in their local com-
munities. That is why the union-community connection can be glimpsed in sto-
ries told elsewhere in this book. For example, when unions in western New York
decided to become more directly involved in promoting high-road economic de-
velopment, by becoming the developers of an energy production facility and af-
fordable housing units, they not only took on CBDO functions, they made the
leap to forming a union-controlled development organization. As the foundation
for their leap, the unions that formed the Economic Development Group built
on their years of exercising control over development through collective bar-
gaining. To add a second dimension to their development initiative, the unions
formed a regional development partnership with their historic bargaining part-
ners. The unions have thereby inserted labor-management.relations into their
version of community-labor collaboration for high-road development (Fleron
and Applegate 2004; see also Greer, Byrd, and Fleron, chapter 6 in this book).
In California, Silicon Valley unions, under the leadership of the South Bay La-
bor Council, formed Working Partnerships USA (WPUSA) to mobilize the
community to demand political accountability in the administration of public
development funds. By allying union members with unorganized immigrant
workers and community organizations in a broad community coalition, WPUSA
succeeded in directing funds for community-defined purposes. Their initial suc-
cess provided the platform for seeking direct control over public development
funds. First, WPUSA coalition activists became the public decision makers, by
successfully running for public offices. Then, other activists formed businesses
that, by successfully bidding for public funds, implemented publicly funded de-
velopment. In sum, when unions needed new partners in order to playa new role
in economic development, they created a new community organization. WPUSA,
in turn, took the lead in expanding the economic development agenda, including
sponsoring other 'community organizations as needed (Muller et al. 2003).
In cities across the country, local unions have worked collaboratively with a
variety of community organizations to enact and implement living wage laws (see
Luce, chapter 1 in this book). To facilitate local campaigns, unions have also
worked closely with a national-level community empowerment organization,
ACORN. By coordinating local efforts and providing critical support, ACORN's
Living Wage Resource Center has played a significant role in making separate liv-
ing wage campaigns into a national movement. It is important to note that these
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coordinating skills were not developed for the occasion. ACORN's contributions
are rooted in its long history of fashioning a community development agenda in
dozens of cities and hundreds of chapters, while coordinating the work of these
organizations so that their agenda has influence at city, state, and national levels.
It is equally important to recognize that union collaboration with ACORN ex-
isted well before the living wage campaign, and in a most distinctive fashion.
ACORN's comprehensive approach to community empowerment led organizers
to mobilize their members to gain power at their workplaces as well as in their
communities. In the 1980s these efforts culminated in the creation of two Service
Employee International Union locals covering workers in four states: SEIU Local
100 (Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas) and Local 880 (Illinois). As the continuing
collaboration between these union locals and ACORN chapters makes clear, they
provide a model in which the union-CBDO connection is established on the ba-
sis of affiliated, and not just allied, organizations (see ACORN website, http://
www.acorn.org; for ACORN history, see Delgado 1986).
Whereas WPUSA found it necessary to sponsor community organizations to
carry out its union empowerment agenda, ACORN found it necessary to spon-
sor union locals to carry out its community empowerment agenda. Together, they
demonstrate that the connection between unions and community organizations
runs in both directions. In the terms of the metaphor used to describe alternative
approaches to the neoliberal development model, these organizations have con-
structed the two-way thoroughfare on which the high road can be rebuilt.
These examples only begin to tell the full story, but they underscore the con-
vergence taking place between unions and CBDOs in their efforts to create new
institutional means for gaining control over economic development. Because
union innovations do not simply replicate community experience, the means are
multiplying. Because the political environment is unfriendly to their agendas,
unions and CBDOs are both working with broad community coalitions to create
the political opportunity structures required to push ahead. If these examples ac-
curately represent the current direction of the evolving relationship between
unions and community-based development organizations, then the long-delayed
moment of their full collaboration may finally be at hand.
